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Abstract     
 
Characterizing the anticipated performance of energy technologies to inform policy decisions 
increasingly relies on expert elicitation. Knowledge about how elicitation design factors impact 
the probabilistic estimates emerging from these studies is however scarce. We focus on nuclear 
power, a large-scale low-carbon power option, for which future cost estimates are important to 
designing energy policies and climate change mitigation efforts. We use data from three 
elicitations in the USA and in Europe and assess the role of government Research, Development, 
and Demonstration (RD&D) investments on expected nuclear costs in 2030. We show that 
controlling for expert, technology, and design characteristics increases experts’ implied public 
RD&D elasticity of expected costs by 25%. Public sector and industry experts’ costs expectations 
are 14% and 32% higher, respectively than academics. US experts are more optimistic than their 
EU counterparts, with median expected costs 22% lower. On average, a doubling of public 
RD&D is expected to result in an 8% cost reduction, but uncertainty is large. The difference 
between the 90
th and 10
th percentile estimates is on average 58% of the experts’ median estimates.  
Public RD&D investments do not affect uncertainty ranges, but US experts’ are less confident 
about costs than Europeans. 
 
 
PACS: 
01.78.+p Science and government 
89.30.Gg Nuclear fission power (for fission reactors, see 28.41.-i and 28.50.-k in nuclear physics) 
89.65.Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, business and management (for economic 
issues regarding production and use of renewable energy, see 88.05.Lg) 
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Nuclear power, uncertainty, returns to RD&D, expert elicitations, meta-analysis 
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1.  Introduction 
Developing energy policies that are robust to a broad set of possible future conditions typically 
requires explicit (Nakicenovic and Riahi, 2002) or implicit (Nordhaus, 2008) characterization of 
the anticipated performance of individual energy technologies. Representing future technological 
change introduces considerable uncertainty into decision-making because, as we know from past 
data, energy technologies have been dynamic (Grubler et al., 1999). And even though future 
change is uncertain, we are not completely ignorant. Dispersed researchers have produced data 
and developed tools that, in combination, provide the basis for probabilistic estimates of future 
improvements in technology. A well-established methodology used to this end is expert 
elicitation. 
 
Expert elicitations gather the informed opinions of experts on technical questions that fall within 
their area of knowledge and expertise. Data collection is carried out using elicitation protocols 
carefully designed to reduce heuristics and biases (Hogarth, 1987; Morgan and Henrion, 1990; 
Cooke, 1991). These data-gathering efforts are particularly useful in decisions that require an 
assessment of the future evolution of energy technologies because historic data may not inform 
on future performance and costs or the relevant data might not be available.  
 
Energy policy making relies on experts’ estimates of the future performance, costs, and safety of 
energy technologies (Apostolakis, 1990). A prominent one is the study undertaken by the 
European Commission and the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission during the 1990s 
on the uncertainty surrounding accident consequence codes for nuclear power plants (Cooke and 
Goossens, 2004). Six years ago, the National Research Council released a report with a strong 
recommendation that the U.S. Department of Energy begin to use expert elicitation for their 
RD&D allocation decisions, to explicitly characterize probabilistic estimates of the outcomes of 
RD&D investments (NRC, 2007). Over the past few years, research groups on both sides of the 
Atlantic have gathered data from expert elicitations on the future of several energy technologies 
to inform energy RD&D policy (Anadon et al., 2011; Anadon et al., 2012; Baker and Keisler, 
2011; Baker et al., 2009a, b; Chan et al., 2011; Curtright et al., 2008; Bosetti et al., 2012). The 
ability to use probabilistic data from various elicitations to characterize future energy technology 
uncertainty and improve the reliability of estimates is valuable for impact assessment evaluations 
such as the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF) and the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), especially in light of the magnitude of investments being considered to support energy 
technologies and the costs and time involved in collecting elicitation data.  
 
This paper takes a first step in this direction and focuses on three recent expert elicitations on the 
future costs of nuclear fission technologies carried out by groups at Carnegie Mellon, FEEM 
(Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei) and Harvard. This collection of experts’ estimates provides a rich 
resource with which to inform RD&D, energy, and nuclear policy decisions on future nuclear 
costs and on the uncertainty surrounding them. However, substantial differences in expert 
composition, elicitation design and technology considered make it difficult to draw more than 
very general conclusions when looking at the multiple elicitations. Such differences are very 
likely to affect experts’ estimates. Previous studies, for example, pointed at the importance of 
protocol design and expert selection as key for elicitation results (Raiffa, 1968; Keeney and 
Winterfeldt, 1991; Meyer and Booker, 1991; Phillips, 1999; Clemen and Reilly, 2001; Walls and 
Quigley, 2001). However, no empirical assessments of the impact and size of differences in 
expert selection and elicitation design have been carried out to date. Similarly, no empirical 
analysis exists on the size and shape of the relationship between public RD&D investments and 
the future cost of nuclear power (or any other technology) emerging from elicitations data.    
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Our contribution fills this gap in the literature. First, provide important insights on the bias 
introduced by specific elicitation design decisions by assessing how experts’ characteristics affect 
estimates of cost and uncertainty. The FEEM and Harvard studies are similar in elicitation design 
and method (both were conducted online), but include a heterogeneous group of experts in terms 
of affiliation and nationalities, allowing investigation of how characteristics of the expert 
influence their beliefs about the returns to public RD&D. Conversely, the CMU elicitation was 
administered in person, but only includes data for Gen. III/III+ consistent with a business as usual 
U.S. public RD&D funding scenario. Hence we provide some preliminary results on whether or 
not in person elicitations are associated with statistically significant differences on costs under a 
BAU public RD&D scenario.  Second, we derive an average estimate of the elasticity of (future) 
nuclear costs to (future) nuclear public RD&D investments that accounts for expert, design, and 
technology differences. This is a valuable parameter for both policy makers and modelers 
interested in uncertainty analysis, which can be compared with historical estimates of returns to 
RD&D (NRC, 2001). 
   
2.  Data  
We use responses from 67 experts about the future costs of nuclear power conditional on 
specified levels of RD&D investment obtained via expert elicitation included in the Harvard/ 
FEEM (Anadon et al., 2012) and CMU (Abdulla et al., In press) studies (25 experts in the 
Harvard elicitation, 30 in the FEEM elicitation, and 12 in the CMU elicitation). Table S1 in the 
supplementary material summarizes the key characteristics from these elicitation studies.   
Harvard and FEEM used online tools to elicit US and EU experts, respectively. In the CMU study 
experts completed a paper-based instrument during an in person meeting.  
 
For each expert, the three elicitations collected estimates of the 50
th, 10
th and 90
th percentile of 
expected overnight capital costs in 2030 for different types of reactors, conditional on levels of 
public annual RD&D funding.  All elicited estimates are in 2010$.  All experts provided 
estimates consistent with the business as usual (BAU) funding scenarios, where yearly public 
RD&D investment to 2030 would not significantly change from the present investment in the 
United States or in the European Union, depending on the study. Moreover, the FEEM and 
Harvard experts were asked about 3 additional RD&D scenarios: (1) a Recommended budget 
scenario, with a yearly public RD&D investment level chosen by the experts (ranging between 
1.5 and 20 times BAU investments); (2) a Half Recommended budget scenario, with a public 
RD&D investment equal to half the yearly amount in the Recommended budget scenario; and (3) 
a 10X Recommended scenario, with a public RD&D investment equal to ten times the yearly 
amount in the Recommended budget scenario. Not all experts provided all estimates for all 
technologies, RD&D funding scenarios, and percentile values.  
 
Figure 1 shows a wide range of estimates of future costs under different public nuclear RD&D 
investment scenarios for large-scale Gen. III/III+ reactor systems (Harvard in the upper panel, 
FEEM in the middle and CMU in the lower)  Similar figures for the large-scale Gen. IV reactor 
systems and SMRs are reported in the SI.  17 of the FEEM and Harvard experts also participated 
in a group meeting in which they discussed the rationale behind their answers and could 
potentially converge towards a consensus answer (Dalkey, 1969). However, as documented in 
Anadon et al. (2012), only a few experts made marginal changes to their estimates.  
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Figure 1. Elicitation results for large-scale Gen. III/III+ reactor systems for the FEEM, Harvard and CMU 
studies (Abdulla et al., In press; Anadon et al., 2012).  The data points represent the 50
th percentile estimates.  
The top and bottom error bars denote the 10
th and 90
th percentiles, respectively. The “2010 ref.” data point 
includes the experts’ estimates of costs in 2010, of interest given the fact that there are few reactors being built in 
both the US and the EU.  CMU experts 6 and 8 did not provide a 50
th percentile estimate.  
 
 
3.  Approach 
Our first objective is to understand how scenarios with different levels of potential public RD&D 
investment affect experts’ central estimates (50
th percentile) of the costs of nuclear technologies 
in 2030. Second, we assess whether the RD&D investment level also impacts the range of 
uncertainty surrounding these cost estimates. We define uncertainty here as the difference 
between the 90
th and the 10
th percentile of expected costs, normalized by the median (50
th 
percentile). We thus use information on experts’ responses for each technology in each RD&D 
scenario. Given that, as explained above, not all experts provided all cost estimates, we end up 
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with 393 observations in the analysis of the central estimate and 389 observations in the analysis 
of the uncertainty range.  
 
We draw on two strands of literature to choose a functional form for our specifications. First, the 
literature on learning-by-doing (LbD) finds that the accumulation of experience in manufacturing 
and/or project development, proxied by capacity, often leads to productivity improvements 
(Arrow, 1962). In this “learning-curve” model, the rate of cost reductions in different 
technologies is a function of the number of units installed or produced. LbD is investigated using 
a ln-ln specification linking technology costs and experience and has been applied to a wide range 
of technologies (Bodde, 1977; Junginger et al., 2005; Grubler et al., 1999; Goldemberg et al., 
2004).  The “two factor learning curve” model augments the basic specification with a learning-
by-searching factor accounting for the impact of RD&D investments on costs (Kouvaritakis et al., 
2000; Klaassen et al., 2005; Soderholm and Klaassen, 2007).  We choose the ln-ln specification 
as our main model of the relationship between future costs and public RD&D investments. We 
however do not include a learning-by-doing variable because experts provided their cost 
estimates conditional on just RD&D investments (note that the CMU study only provides 
estimates consistent with a BAU public RD&D funding scenario in the US).   
 
The second strand of literature focuses on returns to RD&D (Evenson and Kislev, 1976; Evenson, 
1984; Segerstrom, 1998; Popp, 2002; Tassey, 2003; Bosch et al., 2005; Hall et al., 2009). These 
contributions generally suggest that if too many resources are devoted to RD&D in a short time 
frame, technology cost improvements could exhibit diminishing returns (Kortum, 1997; Popp et 
al., 2012). Diminishing marginal returns are usually tested with the inclusion of a quadratic 
RD&D term or a negative exponential function (Blanford, 2009). We thus also test a linear 
specification relating technology costs with RD&D and its squared term. 
 
3.1. Dependent variable: experts’ estimates of overnight capital cost 
As explained above, we consider two different dependent variables to explore the impact of 
RD&D investment on expected nuclear costs: the 50
th percentile estimate of overnight capital cost 
in 2030 and normalized uncertainty, defined as (p90-p10)/p50. Descriptive on both variables are 
presented in Table 1. The average expected cost of nuclear technologies in 2030 is around 4,800 
in $/kW, with estimates as low as 506 $/kW but also experts expecting costs as high as 14,156 
$/kW. Uncertainty ranges between 0.10 and 1.83, with an average value of 0.58. Table S2 in the 
SI contains a breakdown of the central estimate observations by RD&D scenario and technology 
type. 
 
3.2. Independent variables: research design and experts’ characteristics 
The estimates of costs provided by the experts are conditional on RD&D investment but also on 
the type of technology included in the elicitations. Specifically, the assumed yearly public RD&D 
investment levels range from $2,000 million to 80 billion dollars across the four different 
scenarios (BAU, Recommended, Half recommended and 10X recommended) (Table 1). With 
respect to technology characteristics, our observations are almost equally divided between Gen. 
III/III+ technologies, Gen. IV technologies and small and medium sized reactors (SMRs). We 
define these technology categories in detail in the SI. 
 
Among the observables that could potentially affect elicitation results we consider both variables 
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capturing differences across experts within studies (indicating individual characteristics). For 
example, studies suggest that selecting a diverse pool of experts can help avoiding anchoring to a 
usually conservative reference point (Meyer and Booker, 1991).  Table S3 in the supplementary 
material discusses and justifies the selection of the control variables.  
 
Around 45% of our experts belong to public institutions (including supra-national European 
organizations), while 27% work in industry and the remaining 28% are academics (Table 1). 
Moreover, around 55% of our expert pool work in the United States (“USA” variable), with the 
remaining 45% working in the European Union. Only 3% of the data in our sample (the CMU 
elicitations) was obtained through a face-to-face interview rather than on-line (“In-person” 
variable).   
 
  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Notes: the R&D rec. and the R&D high variables are dummy variables equal to 1 if the associated expert’s 
cost estimate refers to the recommended and high R&D scenarios, respectively. The average values of the 
variables therefore represent the share of cost estimate referring to that specific R&D scenario within our 
sample.  
 
Omitting expert and technology subscripts, our main specification reads as follows:  
 
ln          ln  &          
 
Where  y is either the central estimate of future technology costs (50
th percentile) or the 
uncertainty range (p90-p10/p50), RD&D is the yearly public research and development budget in 
nuclear technologies associated with each cost estimate, z is the column vector of control 
variables as listed in table S2, and   is an i.i.d. error component with mean zero and variance   . The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
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The main shortcoming of the above specification is that there might be some unobservable 
individual characteristics that are likely to bias the estimates above and beyond what we can 
control for using our independent variables. We therefore check the robustness of our results also 
including experts’ fixed effects.  
 
4.  Results 
We present here the main results of the specifications for costs and the uncertainty range.   
Additional results are presented in the SI.  
4.1. Predictors of median overnight capital costs 
Table 2 presents the results of 7 specifications focusing on the 50
th percentile of expected 
overnight capital. Model 1 is a simple correlation in which we estimate the effect of (future) 
annual public RD&D investment on (future) cost without controlling for any other observable 
characteristics. The estimated coefficient is significant and indicates that a doubling of yearly 
public energy RD&D investment in nuclear technologies (equivalent to a 100% increase) is 
associated on average with 7% decrease in overnight capital costs by 2030. In model 2, we drop 
the continuous RD&D variable and use dummy variables associated with different RD&D levels. 
Specifically, the reference categories include BAU and half recommended RD&D budget level, 
while the dummy variables “RD&D rec.” and “RD&D high” indicate each expert’s 
recommendation of RD&D investment and 10 times the expert’s recommended level, 
respectively.  The notion here is that using the actual RD&D levels provided in the elicitation 
may exaggerate the precision with which experts can be expected to understand the returns to 
RD&D.  The hypothesis is that experts are better equipped to distinguish between low, medium, 
and high levels of RD&D.  Both variables are significant and in the expected direction. The 
effects of high RD&D is twice that of recommended RD&D: high public RD&D investments are 
associated with costs that are on average approximately 21% lower than “low” public RD&D 
investment scenario (which refers to the BAU and half recommended public RD&D scenarios). 
Note that approximate refers to the fact that this is a close approximation given that the dependent 
variables is in log form—we use this terminology throughout when interpreting the effect dummy 
coefficients. The elicitation questions on RD&D thrusts included in the FEEM and Harvard 
elicitations and the group workshop conducted by the FEEM and Harvard teams shed some light 
onto what technical issues experts thought public RD&D investments could address.  Some of the 
key issues were additional work on modeling and demonstration projects to test the economics of 
Gen. IV designs, with a particular focus on sodium-cooled fast reactors, high-temperature 
reactors, and gas-cooled fast reactors, and also research to improve the safety and proliferation 
resistance of Gen. IV designs.  Regarding SMRs, experts expressed the need for RD&D to safety 
test and demonstrate the viability and operability of light-water reactor designs, and to develop 
more advanced fuels and materials. Given that the full list of RD&D thrusts is too long to include 
here, the reader is referred to Anadon et al. (2011) for a more comprehensive list. 
 
The fit of models 1 and 2 is low but improves dramatically when the controls for experts’ 
affiliation, the type of technology and the area of origin of the expert are added to the model 
(model 3 and model 4, respectively). In model 3, as a result of the inclusion of the additional 
controls, the coefficient on the RD&D variable is associated with a significant increase of roughly 
25%, going from 0.0676 to 0.0843. Hence, a doubling of public RD&D yearly budget for nuclear 
technologies is associated with an 8% decrease of nuclear costs in 2030, on average and ceteris 
paribus. This indicates that any policy insight based on the correlation emerging from model 1 
substantially underestimates the impact of public funding on nuclear cost reductions. Similar 
conclusions can be reached with respect to the RD&D levels as measured by dummy variables in The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
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models 2 and 4. Specifically, as a result of the inclusion of the additional controls, the central 
estimate of costs under the recommended RD&D scenario is approximately 14.7%, a significant 
increase from the approximate value of 10.8% in model 2 without the controls.  Similarly, the 
effect of high R&D also increases with the controls. 
 
Model 5 further explores the role of data acquisition method by including a dummy variable to 
control for face-to face interview, but the estimated coefficient is not statistically significant. 
Finally, models 6 and 7 include experts’ dummies in models 3 and 5, respectively, to account for 
unobservable expert characteristics that might be correlated with the elicited median costs. 
Adding expert fixed effects only slightly reduces the coefficient associated with the RD&D 
variable, but the estimate is still roughly 15% higher than in model 1.  
 
The results for the other control variables (using model 3) show that experts from public 
institutions have estimates of overnight capital costs that are about 14% higher on average than 
those of academics. Estimates for experts from industry are even higher, on average 
approximately 31% higher than academics. This difference could be explained by the fact that 
industry experts are generally more likely to think about potential escalations on labor, materials, 
licensing, and permitting costs than their academic counterparts, since academic experts may tend 
to be more detached from these less technical costs.  Overnight capital costs are expected to be 
higher for both Gen. IV and SMR technologies with respect to Gen. III/III+ technologies by 
approximately 23% and 24%, respectively. Expected overnight capital costs are about 22% lower 
for experts in the USA when compared to experts in the European Union. All of the above 
controls are significant across all 5 models in Table 2 in which they are included.  The inclusion 
of the fixed effects in models 6 and 7 leads to increases in the magnitude of the coefficients for 
expert characteristics controls, although the sign and statistical significance remain the same.  The 
in-person variable becomes negative and significant when expert fixed effects are included 
(model 7), although it is difficult to draw conclusions about this effect since it requires inclusion 
of unobserved expert characteristics for it to become significant.  In-person effects will be a focus 
of future work assembling additional elicitation data so that more than the 3% of observations are 
in-person.   We focus our interpretation on models 1-5, without fixed effects.  But the role of 
expert fixed effects does suggest that additional expert characteristics might be important to 
gather in future work. 
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Table 2 Estimates of expert’s elicited 50
th percentile of overnight capital cost. Y = ln(P50) 
 
 
Figure 2 shows how the estimated returns to public RD&D vary when accounting for observable 
expert, study and technology characteristics (models 1 and 3 compared). The x-axis shows public 
RD&D investment plotted in a log-scale, while the y-axis shows the associated overnight capital 
costs in 2030, also plotted in a log-scale. The lines in the graph represent the returns to RD&D 
estimated without controlling for other observable characteristics (discontinuous line – model 1) 
and including additional controls (continuous line, model 3). As already mentioned, not 
controlling for observable characteristics leads to a 25% underestimation of the effect of public 
RD&D investment on nuclear technology costs (meaning, the discontinuous line is 25% less steep 
than the continuous line). In addition, observable characteristics account for the distance between 
the two lines.   
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(R&D) ‐0.0676*** ‐0.0843*** ‐0.0852*** ‐0.0778*** ‐0.0778***
[5.11e‐06] [1.73e‐09] [1.42e‐09] [0] [0]
R&D 
recommended
‐0.108** ‐0.147***
[0.0383] [0.00317]
R&D high ‐0.213*** ‐0.249***
[1.40e‐05] [6.69e‐08]
public 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.142*** 0.857*** 1.398***
[0.000150] [0.00102] [0.000140] [2.58e‐08] [0]
industry 0.312*** 0.322*** 0.317*** 0.906*** 1.570***
[0] [0] [0] [4.38e‐09] [0]
USA ‐0.220*** ‐0.200*** ‐0.218*** ‐0.329*** ‐1.129***
[0] [5.72e‐09] [8.81e‐11] [0] [0]
GEN IV 0.228*** 0.232*** 0.222*** 0.227*** 0.227***
[8.30e‐07] [1.45e‐06] [5.30e‐06] [4.47e‐08] [4.47e‐08]
SMR 0.240*** 0.244*** 0.233*** 0.259*** 0.259***
[9.67e‐07] [1.64e‐06] [6.03e‐06] [2.62e‐08] [2.62e‐08]
in‐person ‐0.0723 ‐0.541***
[0.476] [7.68e‐06]
Expert FE 
dummies
NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Constant 8.926*** 8.488*** 8.849*** 8.294*** 8.859*** 8.225*** 9.025***
Observations 393 393 393 393 393 393 393
Adjusted R‐
squared
0.052 0.044 0.233 0.218 0.232 0.619 0.619
Robust p‐values in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
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Figure 2 RD&D and technology cost with and without observable expert, technology and study characteristics. 
Axes in logarithmic scales.  
 
The SI includes additional specifications, all of which produced results in line with those above.  
These include: a normalized cost variable (calculated dividing the 2030 estimate by the 2010 
estimate for the observations in the FEEM and Harvard studies) in both the linear, log-log and 
semi-log model; diminishing marginal returns to RD&D investments (RD&D
2); interacting 
dummies with RD&D and with each other; and Box-Cox transformation to further investigate the 
most appropriate functional form. 
4.2. Predictors of dispersion in costs 
Here we test whether dispersion in technology costs is affected by the level of RD&D funding 
and the observable expert, technology and study characteristics. Table 3 reports specifications in 
line with those included in Table 2but where the dependent variable is now the measure of the 
range of uncertainty, (P90-P10)/P50.   
 
We find that public RD&D investments are not statistically significant predictors of the 
uncertainty range provided by the experts.  That is, higher or lower levels or investments are not 
systematically associated with narrower or wider uncertainty ranges under any of the seven 
specifications tested. US experts have significantly wider uncertainty ranges when compared to 
EU experts, approximately 16% larger according to model 5.  In this case, the in-person variable 
is significant, and suggests that the uncertainty ranges for experts providing answers in person for 
the BAU RD&D scenario were about 40% lower, although the sign of this effect is not robust to 
the inclusion of expert fixed effects.  The uncertainty range for SMRs is around 14% smaller than 
that for large scale Gen. III/III+, suggesting that experts are relatively confident about their cost 
estimates on these systems, which are expected to be delivered to the site fully constructed from 
the manufacturing facilities, even though the current experience is limited and no operating 
licenses have been issued in the United States or the EU.  The group workshop conducted by the 
FEEM and Harvard teams also shed some light regarding the uncertainties they considered when 
making their estimates, which included the costs of materials, increased safety requirements, 
differences in contract structures, and the outcomes of RD&D on materials and fuel fabrication. 
As shown in the SI, the results on the uncertainty range are generally robust to changes in the 
functional form used in the empirical estimation.  The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
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Table 3 Estimates of effects on variation in nuclear costs. Y=ln[(p90-p10)/p50]   
 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Because nuclear power is one of the few large-scale low-carbon power technologies available, 
understanding its future cost is important for the design of climate change mitigation efforts.  As 
expert elicitations and models relying on expert elicitation data are increasingly used in science 
policy contexts, scrutiny of their reliability is certain to increase.  But at present, knowledge about 
the impact of design factors on the probabilistic estimates emerging from these studies is scarce. 
In this paper we combined three recent elicitations on the future (2030) cost of three types of 
nuclear power reactor types: large-scale Gen. III/III+ systems, large-scale Gen. IV systems, and 
small modular reactors. We provide insights about: (a) how the design of the elicitation and the 
selection of the experts affect nuclear elicitation results—thereby providing guidance for future 
elicitations; and (b) the expected returns to government nuclear RD&D.  The results show that 
sector and geographic location of the expert, reactor type, and RD&D investment are statistically 
significant factors affecting experts’ estimates of overnight capital cost and are robust to the two 
specifications supported by the literature: a ln-ln specification and a linear specification with a 
quadratic term. 
 
Controlling for expert characteristics increases the estimated public RD&D elasticity of expected 
costs by 25%. We also show that academic experts are the most optimistic about the future costs 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(R&D) 0.0119 0.0207 0.0162 ‐0.00128 ‐0.00128
[0.599] [0.366] [0.480] [0.925] [0.925]
R&D  0.0108 0.0189
[0.877] [0.788]
R&D high ‐0.0279 ‐0.0228
[0.717] [0.766]
public 0.0629 0.0692 0.0689 ‐0.620*** ‐1.463***
[0.371] [0.323] [0.328] [6.62e‐11] [0]
industry 0.0619 0.0601 0.0905 ‐0.883*** ‐0.993***
[0.441] [0.455] [0.254] [0] [4.90e‐06]
USA 0.154** 0.151** 0.163*** 0.405*** ‐0.439**
[0.0136] [0.0152] [0.00914] [0] [0.0264]
GEN IV ‐0.0433 ‐0.0335 ‐0.0793 ‐0.0544 ‐0.0544
[0.551] [0.649] [0.278] [0.247] [0.247]
SMR ‐0.101 ‐0.0925 ‐0.139* ‐0.0821* ‐0.0821*
[0.163] [0.209] [0.0573] [0.0876] [0.0876]
in‐person ‐0.398* 0.843***
[0.0615] [2.30e‐05]
Expert FE  NO NO NO NO NO YES YES
Constant ‐0.770*** ‐0.678*** ‐0.913*** ‐0.765*** ‐0.857*** ‐0.0648 0.778***
Observations 389 389 389 389 389 389 389
Adjusted R‐
squared ‐0.002 ‐0.005 0.009 0.005 0.018 0.694 0.694
Robust p‐values in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
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of nuclear reactors.  On average public and industry experts expect costs to be approximately 
14% and 32% higher, respectively than academics. Since academic experts are typically more 
removed from technology commercialization than their counterparts, this may be expected, 
although the significance and magnitude of the effect had never been estimated.  US experts were 
more optimistic than their EU counterparts, with expected costs that were on average about 22% 
lower.  This could be related to the fact that the EU has more recent experience building nuclear 
power plants than the USA, and that these projects have suffered from cost overruns.  Both of 
these findings indicate that expert selection has a large impact on elicitation results.   
 
This result applies beyond expert elicitations to other efforts to estimate the cost of meeting 
climate change targets, which inevitably rely on assumptions about technology costs.  It suggests 
that more transparency about the source of the estimates in integrated assessment models and 
other policy analysis models may be necessary.  If academic experts are indeed more optimistic 
about future costs, current efforts that emphasize academic assessments could underestimate 
costs. Sensitivity analysis thus becomes paramount.  
 
In the elicitations included in this study, the normalized uncertainty range—defined by the 
difference between the 90
th and 10
th percentile estimates divided by the 50
th percentiles—is on 
average 58% of the experts median estimates, highlighting the large uncertainty around future 
nuclear costs.  Further, public RD&D investments do not affect uncertainty ranges, but experts 
provided lower uncertainty ranges for SMRs when compared to Gen. III/III+ and Gen. IV 
reactors.  This seems somewhat surprising given the greater level of experience with Gen. III/III+ 
systems, but could be explained by a greater confidence of experts in the ability of centralized 
manufacturing of SMRs to deliver reactors on time and on budget when compared to large scale 
projects, which have had widely varying costs in the past.  Gen. III/III+ systems are expected to 
still be cheaper than Gen. IV and SMRs by 2030.  In fact, even though the uncertainty around 
future SMR costs is lower, overnight capital costs are expected to be on average about 23% 
greater than that of Gen. III/III+ systems and only a little above large-scale Gen. IV systems.   
 
These differences indicate that the specificity with which technologies are defined is an important 
elicitation design characteristic to consider. We find no evidence that the method of administering 
the survey (in-person) has a significant impact on costs, although our analyses have low power 
since so few observations involved in-person interviews.  We do see that the uncertainty range 
decreases when the elicitation was administered in-person when compared to online, although it 
is possible that differences in the background information of the survey or the online displays 
have contributed to this.  Finally, even though academic experts had lower estimates of costs, 
their uncertainty ranges were not different from those of industry and public institution experts. 
 
We also find strong evidence that public RD&D investments present decreasing marginal returns.  
This indicates that when experts assess the impact of RD&D on cost their mental model includes 
considerations of depletion of improvement opportunities within a limited period of time.   
 
Overall, this study shows quantitatively the importance of expert selection and elicitation design 
and of the need to increase transparency in modeling and policy analysis exercises about the 
source of technology assumptions.  More precise estimates are likely to become available as a 
larger body of elicitation study results is included into this type of analysis.  The RD&D elasticity 
estimates condense the literature available and could be used in modeling exercises.  This work 
also provides a condensed view of central estimates that may be useful directly for research 
program managers and policy makers.  On average, a doubling of public RD&D is expected to 
result in cost reductions around 8% in 2030, but uncertainty is very large. Overall, these insights 
regarding future costs, their uncertainty, the expected returns to public RD&D, and the The future costs of nuclear power     Anadon, Nemet, and Verdolini 
13 
 
importance of the source of estimates are important for more efficient and transparent analysis 
about technology strategies to meet climate challenges. 
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